A New Age in the History of Philosophy: the World Dialogue Between Philosophical Traditions by Dussel, Enrique
A  NEW  AGE  IN  THE  HISTORY  OF
PHILOSOPHY: THE  WORLD  DIALOGUE
BETWEEN  PHILOSOPHICAL  TRADITIONS
Enrique Dussel
UAM-Iz., México
Abstract
This paper argues the following points: 1. It is neces-
sary to affirm that all of humanity has always sought to ad-
dress certain “core universal problems” that are present in
all cultures. 2. The rational responses to these “core prob-
lems” first acquire the shape of mythical narratives. 3. The
formulation of categorical philosophical discourses is a sub-
sequent development in human rationality, which does not
however negate all mythical narratives. These discourses
arose in all the great urban Neolithic cultures (even if only in
initial form). 4. Modern European philosophy confused its
economic, political and cultural domination, and the result-
ing crises in other philosophical traditions, with a Eurocentric
universality claim, which must be questioned. 5. In any case
there are formal universal aspects in which all regional phi-
losophies can coincide, and which respond to the “core prob-
lems” at an abstract level. 6. All of this impels entry into a
new Age of inter-philosophical dialogue, respectful of differ-
ences and open to learning from the useful discoveries of other
traditions. 7. A new philosophical project must be developed
that is capable of going beyond Eurocentric philosophical
Modernity, by shaping a global Trans-modern pluriverse,
drawing upon the “discarded” (by the Modernity) own re-
sources of peripheral, subaltern, postcolonial philosophies.
In this paper I will explore a theme that I believe should occupy us
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for a significant portion of the 21st century: our recognition and accep-
tance of the meaning, value, and history of all regional philosophi-
cal traditions on the planet (European, North American, Chinese,
Indian, Arab, African, Latin American, etc.).
This will be the first time in the history of philosophy that these
diverse traditions will be open to an authentic and symmetrical dialogue-a
dialogue that will enable us to understand many aspects unknown to us,
aspects that may be better developed in some traditions than in others.
This dialogue will play a key role in unlocking the contents of the daily life
of humanity in other cultures, thanks to the enormous machinery of mass
media that makes it possible for us to receive news instantaneously of
cultures about which we lack first hand knowledge, and will also imply an
ethical positioning grounded in the equal recognition of all philosophical
communities with equal rights of argumentation. This will make it possible
for us to transcend the Eurocentrism of Modernity, so prevalent today,
which impedes creativity and often obscures the great discoveries achieved
by other traditions.
1. Universal Core Problems
When I refer to “universal core problems,” I mean those funda-
mental questions (of an ontological character) that homo sapiens posed
upon attaining a certain level of maturity. Once their level of cerebral de-
velopment allowed for consciousness, self-consciousness, linguistic, ethi-
cal and social development (that is, responsibility for their own acts), hu-
man beings confronted the totality of the real in order to manage things
in such a way as to achieve the reproduction and development of human
life in community. Human bewilderment in the face of the possible causes
of natural phenomena was further compounded by the unpredictability of
their own impulses and behaviors, leading to questions regarding “core
problems” such as:  What are real things in their totality and how do they
behave?  Such questions encompass phenomena ranging from the astro-
nomical to the simple falling of a stone or the artificial production of fire.
They also encompass the mystery of their own human subjectivity, the
ego, interiority, spontaneity, as well as the nature of freedom and the cre-
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ation of the social and ethical world.  In the end, they arrive at the
question of how we interpret the ultimate foundation of everything that
is real, and the universe itself?  Which in turn leads to the classic ontologi-
cal question: “Why being and not nothingness?” These basic “core prob-
lems” have inevitably been faced by all human communities since the re-
motest period of the Paleolithic age; they are among the many possible
variations of the universal “whys,” and are present in every culture and
tradition.
The content and the way of responding to these “core problems”
unleashes, impels, and disperses diverse trajectories of rational narra-
tives, if by rationality we understand simply that reasons have been pro-
vided in support of assertions, and that these assertions are intended to
interpret or explain phenomena that have “appeared” at the initial level of
each of these “core problems.”
2. The Rational Development of Mythical Narratives
Throughout all of its stages of development, humanity has always
and inevitably given linguistic expression to rational responses (under-
stood here to mean those that are proffered with some kind of underlying
foundation, regardless of its specific character, at least until it is refuted) to
core problems such as those described above. This has occurred as the
result of a process involving the “production of myths” (mytho-poiésis).
The production of myths was the first rational form of interpreta-
tion or explanation of reality (of the world, subjectivity, the ethical practi-
cal horizon, and the ultimate reference of reality that is described symboli-
cally).  From this perspective myths are symbolic narratives that are not
irrational and that do not refer exclusively to singular phenomena. They
are symbolic enunciations, and therefore have a “double meaning” that
can only be fully elucidated through a hermeneutical process that uncov-
ers the layers of reasoning behind them. It is in this sense that they are
rational, and that they must be grasped in terms of the extent to which their
content has a universal significance, given their reference to circumstances
that are susceptible to repetition, and constructed upon the basis of con-
cepts (cerebral categorizations or cerebral maps that involve millions of
neurons and imply the convergence in meaning of multiple and singular
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Numerous myths are organized according to their relationship to
the core problems that I have just highlighted, and have been preserved in
the collective memory of communities throughout the world. This was first
done through oral tradition, and in written form since 3000 B.C., when
they begin to be collected, remembered, and interpreted by communities
of sages who had a sense of admiration in the face of reality, in the spirit of
Aristotle’s affirmation2: “but he who finds no explanation (in what he sees,
and turns instead to admiration) […] thereby recognizes his ignorance.
This is why he who loves myth (philómythos) is akin to he who loves
wisdom (philósophos)”.  This is how mythical “traditions” emerge to pro-
vide peoples throughout the world with rational explanations related to
the questions that have always been most pressing for humanity, and which
I have defined here as “core problems”. These include peoples as poor
and as “simple” in their material culture as the Tupinamba indigenous people
of Brazil, who according to Claude Lévi-Strauss’ studies, carried out the
responsibilities inherent in their daily lives in ways embedded in the com-
plex web of meaning provided by their vast number of myths.
According to Paul Ricoeur, each culture has an “ethical and mythi-
cal core”3, or “vision of the world” (Weltanschauung) that provides a
framework of interpretation and ethical guidance for the most significant
moments in human existence.  On the other hand, certain cultures (such as
those of China, India, Mesopotamia, Egypt, the Aztec or Mexica, the
Arabs, the Hellenic world, Rome, Russia, etc.,) as a result of their politi-
cal, economic, and military hegemony, were able to consolidate geopoliti-
cal dominance. These processes endowed them a degree of universality
that included the imposition of their mythical structures over those of sub-
altern cultures.  Such patterns of cultural domination are evident through-
out multiple periods of historical development.
As a result of these cultural clashes, certain myths will endure in
subsequent stages (even in the age of categorical philosophical discourses
and of the science of Modernity itself, up to the present). Myths will never
completely disappear as long as some of them continue to make sense, as
Ernst Bloch argues persuasively in his work The Principle of Hope.4
3. The New Rational Development of Discourses with Philosophi-
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cal Categories
We have become accustomed, in the context of explanations of
the transition from mythos  to lógos, to understand this process as a leap
from the irrational to the rational, from the concretely empirical to the
universal, and from the realm of the senses to the realm of concepts. This
is false. They are both rational. Each of the narratives at issues has a
certain degree of rationality, but their specific character varies. There is a
progression in terms of degrees of univocal precision, semantic clarity,
simplicity, and in the conclusive force with which their foundations have
been laid. But there are also losses in multiplicity of meaning when sym-
bols displaced, but which can be hermeneutically rediscovered in diverse
moments and places (as is characteristic of mythical rational narratives).
For example the Promethean or Adamic5 myths continue to have ethical
meaning today.
Thus univocal rational discourse as expressed in philosophical
categories that are capable of defining conceptual content without
recourse to symbols (as in a myth) gains in precision but loses in terms of
its resonance of meaning. All of this nonetheless implies an important
civilizational advance, which opens up the possibility of abstraction in modes
of analysis.  Here, the separation of the semantic content of the phenom-
enon being observed -the description and precise explanation of empiri-
cal reality- enables the observer’s management to be more efficient in
the reproduction and development of human life in community.
In this context, wisdom can order the diverse responses to the
core problems that have been enumerated, and becomes the content of a
differentiated social “role” focused upon the clarification, exposition, and
development of said wisdom. From the perspective of the sociology of
philosophy, communities of philosophers form groups differentiated from
those of priests, artists, political actors, etc. The members of these com-
munities of sages take on a ritualized form constituting “schools of life”
with a strictly disciplinary character (from the Aztecs calmécac to the
Athenian academy or the sages communities of the city of Memphis in the
Egypt of the Third Millennium B.C.), and came to be known as the so-
called “lovers of wisdom” (philo-sóphoi) among the Greeks. But from a
historical perspective the “lovers of myths” were also, strictly speaking,
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“lovers of wisdom,” and this is why those who will later be described as
philosophers should be described more aptly as philo-logists, if lógos is
understood to mean a rational discourse that employs philosophical cat-
egories and no longer has recourse to mythical symbolic narrative, or only
exceptionally and as an example of how philosophical hermeneutics holds
sway.
This process of leaving behind the purest form of mythical rational
expression and stripping away its symbolic content gradually emerged in
all of the great urban cultures of the Neolithic.  This process gives certain
terms or words a univocal, definable meaning with conceptual content
that is the fruit of methodical analytical elaboration and is capable of
moving from the whole to the parts as it fixes its specific meaning. Key
examples of narratives employing philosophical categories began to
emerge in India (subsequent to the Upanishads), in China (from the Book
of Changes or I Ching), in Persia, Mesopotamia, Egypt (in texts such as
those described as the “philosophy of Memphis”), in the Eastern Medi-
terranean between the Phoenicians and the Greeks, in Mesoamerica (the
Maya and Aztecs or Mexican), in the Andean region the amautas among
the Aymaras and the Quechuas, who gave life to Incan civilization, etc.
Among the Aztecs, Quetzal-coatl was the symbolic expression of a dual
ancestral deity (“Quetzal” referring to the green and red feathers of a
beautiful tropical bird as a symbol for divinity, and “coatl” referring to a
twin or brother, the “duality”).  This is what the tlamatinime (“those who
know things,” and  whom Bernardino de Sahagún called “philosophers”6)
described as Ometeotl (from the roots in the Náhuatl language omé, which
means two, and teotl, which refers to divinity), leaving the symbol aside.
This denomination highlighted the “dual origin” of the universe (instead of
the unitary origin characteristic of to én, or the One in Plato or Plotinus,
for example). This indicates the beginning of the transition from symbolic
rationality to the rationality of philosophical conceptual categorization
among the Aztecs, as reflected in the historical figure of the poet and
philosopher-king Nezahúalcoyotl (1402-1472).
Some authors such as Raúl Fornet-Betancourt in Latin America7
concede that philosophy was practiced in Amerindia (before the Euro-
pean invasion in 1492) or in pre-colonial Africa, without much elaboration
of what he understands to be philosophy. Paulin Hountondji’s sharp cri-
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tique of the concept of ethnophilosophy, derived from Placide Tempel’s
book Bantu Philosophy9, highlights the need to better define what we
mean by philosophy in such contexts, in order among other things to dis-
tinguish it from myth.
Nonetheless when we carefully read the first sentences of the Tao
Te-king (or Dao de jing) by the legendary Lao-tze: “The Tao that can be
spoken of is not the constant Tao; the name that can be named is not the
constant name; the nameless is the beginning of Heaven and Earth,”10 we
find ourselves confronted with a text that employs philosophical catego-
ries distant from those of a purely mythical narrative. It is also impossible
today to ignore the argumentative density and rationality characteristic of
the philosophy of K’ung Fu-Tsu (Confucius) (551-479 B.C.),11 and the
levels of philosophical development evident in Mo-Tzu (479-380 B.C.),12
whose continuous, even excessive patterns of argumentation criticized the
social and moral implications of Confucianism, affirming a universalism
with grave political implications, and which was skeptical of rituals and
unduly elaborate organizations or “schools.” His contributions are one of
the pillars of Chinese philosophy that predated the great Confucian syn-
thesis of Meng Tzu (Mencius) (390-305 B.C.).13  This philosophy spans
some 2,500 years, with classics each century, and even during the period
of European Modernity thinkers such as Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529),
who develops the neo-Confucian tradition that extends all the way up to
the present, influencing Mao Tse-tung and playing a role in the emergence
of contemporary capitalism in China and Singapore equivalent to that of
Calvinism in Europe. There was also Huang Tsung-hsi (1610-1695) a
great renovator of political philosophy.
In the same way the philosophies of the Indian subcontinent are
organized in terms of the philosophical expression14 of the core problems.
We read in Chandogya Upanishad:
“In the beginning, my dear, this world was just Being (sat), one only,
without a second. Some people, no doubt, say: In the beginning, verily,
this world was just Nonbeing (asat), one only, without a second; from that
Nonbeing Being was produced. But how, indeed, my dear, could it be so?
said he. How could Being be produced from Nonbeing? On the contrary,
my dear, in the beginning this world was Being alone.”15
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Is it not a philosophical discourse?
In Hinduism the concept of Brahman refers to the totality of the
universe (as does that of Pacha in Quechua among the Incas of Peru);
atman refers to subjectivity, karma to human action, and moksha to the
relationship between atman and Brahman. It is with these “core” con-
cepts as points of departure that a discourse undertaken by means of
philosophical categories begins to be constructed in the fifth century B.C.
It is then with Sankara (788-820 A.D.) that the philosophy of the subcon-
tinent achieves a classical level, which it has continued to develop up to
the present.
Buddhist philosophy, meanwhile, beginning with Siddhartha
Gautama (563-483 B.C.), rejects the concepts of Brahman and atman,
given its assumption that the totality of the universe is an eternal process
unfolding in an interconnected manner (patitya samatpada).  This even
more clearly negates the mythical traditions (such as those of the Vedas),
contributing instead to the construction of a strictly rational narrative, which
is not, as in all philosophies, utterly exempt from mythological moments,
such as ensomátosis, referring to the successive “re-incorporations of
souls.”
Meanwhile, Jainism, whose first exponent was Vardhamana
Mahvira (599-527 B.C.), ontologically defends the Tattvartha Sutra
(“no violence, no possession, no determination”) from the perspective of
a universal vitalism, which has great relevance to the ecological crisis we
face today.
All of this clearly implies that philosophy was not born solely or
originally in Greece, nor can it be taken as the prototype of philosophical
discourse.  This error arises from taking Greek philosophy as the defini-
tion of philosophy itself, rather than discover a clear criteria of demarca-
tion between mythical and philosophical categorical discourse. This con-
fuses the part with the whole: a specific case does not capture the univer-
sal sweep of the definition needed. This does not deny Greek philosophy
its historical place among these philosophies, or its continuity with the
philosophies of the Roman Empire, which in turn opened a cultural hori-
zon towards the so-called Latin-Germanic European Middle Ages. These
will culminate in the European philosophy that laid the foundations for the
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Modernity produced by the European invasion of the American continent,
and the emergence of colonialism and capitalism. The Industrial Revolu-
tion at the end of the 18th century (only two centuries ago) will make
Europe the central dominating civilization in the world-system, up to the
beginning of the 21st century. This domination has obscured and distorted
our understanding of history (due to the combined effects of what I have
described as hellenocentrism and Eurocentrism), and impeded the global
perspective necessary to grasp an authentic history of philosophy.
As a Latin American I am convinced that the future development
of world philosophy will be jeopardized if we do not clarify these issues
by means of a contemporary dialogue between non-Western philosophi-
cal traditions and those of Europe and North America.
In this context, E. Husserl’s reflection set forth below, and re-
peated in general by M. Heidegger and throughout Europe and North
America, seems so naïve:
“Thus philosophy […] is ratio in the constant movement of self-elucida-
tion, begun with the first breakthrough of philosophy into mankind […]
The image of the dawn characterizes Greek philosophy in its beginning
stage, the first elucidation through the first cognitive conception of what
is as universe (des Seienden als Universum) […]”.16
In Latin America, David Sobrevilla essentially supports the same
approach:
“I believe that there is a general consensus that the philosophical activity
of humanity first emerged in Greece and not in the East. In this regard
Hegel and Heidegger appear to be correct, instead of Jaspers, who argues
for the existence of three great philosophical traditions: those of China,
India, and Greece.”17
The philosophy of the East would be philosophy understood in a
broad sense, and that of Greece according to much narrower criteria.
There is a confusion between the origins of European philosophy, which
may in part lie in Greece, and the origins of world philosophy, which has
diverse origins, almost as many as there are fundamental traditions of phi-
losophy. In addition it is assumed that this process was linear, following a
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sequence “from Greek philosophy to Medieval Latin philosophy and from
there to their Modern European expressions.”  But the true historical tra-
jectory was much more complex. Greek philosophy was cultivated sub-
sequently and principally by Byzantine civilization, and Arab philosophy in
turn was the inheritor of Byzantine philosophy, and in particular its Aristo-
telian tradition. This required the creation of an Arabic philosophical lan-
guage in the strictest sense.18
Latin Aristotelian philosophy in Paris in thirteenth century, for ex-
ample, has its origin in Greek texts and their Arabic commentaries (trans-
lated in Toledo, in Spain, by Arab specialists), and these Greek texts were
utilized and commentated by the “Arab Western philosophers” (in the
Caliphate of Cordoba, in Spain), continuing the “Eastern” tradition with
origins in Cairo, Bagdad, or Samarkand. This produced a Greek legacy
profoundly reconstructed from a Semitic perspective (such as that of Arab
civilization), and then passed on to Latins and Germanics in Europe. It is
’Ibn Rushd (Averroes) who marks the origin of the European philosophi-
cal renaissance in the thirteenth century.
All of the world’s great cultures have created philosophies as well,
with varying styles and characteristics of development, but all have pro-
duced (some only initially and others with great depth and precision)
conceptual structural categories that must be recognized as philosophi-
cal.
Philosophical discourse does not destroy myth, although it does
negate those who lose the capacity to resist the empirical argumentation
inherent in such discourse.  For example the myths of Tlacaelel among the
Aztecs, which justified human sacrifice and provided good reasons for
it19, completely collapsed once their impossibility was demonstrated, as
well as their lack of practical feasibility.
In fact, mythical elements may contaminate even the discourses of
great philosophers. For example, Immanuel Kant argues in favor of the
“immortality of the soul” in the “pure practical reason dialectics” of his
Critique of Practical Reason, as a way of resolving the question of the
“supreme Good” (since the soul would receive after death the happiness it
had earned in its earthly life).  But these concepts of the “soul” and of
“immortality” demonstrate the persistence of mythical elements of Indian
origin in the Greek thought-elements that came to permeate all of the
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Roman, Medieval Christian, and Modern European world. The suppos-
edly philosophical proofs provided are in these cases tautological and not
rationally demonstrative upon the basis of empirical facts.  This illustrates
the unrecognized (and in this case inappropriate) presence of mythical
elements in the best philosophies. We might also describe them as ex-
amples of unintentional underlying ideologies.
On the other hand, the “Adamic myth” of the Hebrew Semitic
tradition, which shows that human freedom is the origin of “evil,” and not
a deity, as in the Mesopotamian myth of Gilgamesh, is a mythical narrative
that can still be interpreted anew in the present, and which resists the
rationality of the age of logos.20  The same can be said of the epic narra-
tive of the slaves led by Moses who freed themselves from Egypt-narra-
tives recovered by Ernst Bloch in his previously cited work.
4. The Domination of Modern European Philosophy and its
Universality Claim
Beginning in 1492 Europe conquers the Atlantic, which becomes
the new geopolitical center of hegemony in the world, replacing the Medi-
terranean and extending its sweep all the way to the “Arab sea” (Indian
Ocean) and the “China Sea” (the Pacific). This becomes the basis of new
colonial empires (almost exclusively centered on the American continent
between the 15th and 17th centuries), which in turn make it possible for a
capitalist civilization to develop. It is in this context that Medieval Latin-
Germanic philosophy becomes the core of Modern European philoso-
phy, in a manner inextricably intertwined with its political and economic
hegemonical claim. I believe that the specific philosophical origin of this
process is Bartolomé de Las Casas’s philosophical critique of the new
colonial domination in the Caribbean region in 1514, long before that of
Descartes’s Discourse on Method, written in Amsterdam in 1637. Euro-
pean philosophy was until then singular and regional in character, but
could now reposition itself in terms of a claim to take on the trappings of
philosophy itself. It is valid to characterize the domination of European
philosophy as hegemonic because it imposed its sway on the philosophi-
cal communities that had been colonized or reduced to its periphery. It is
this economic, military and political hegemony that makes it possible for
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modern European philosophy to develop in a unique manner, unlike any
other in the world during the same historical period. My emphasis here,
then, is on exploring possible explanations for this development and its
supposedly universality claim.
Modern colonial expansion through the opening of the Atlantic by
Portugal to the West of Africa, and then towards the Indian Ocean (which
leapt over the “wall” surrounding the Ottoman Empire), and by Spain
towards the Caribbean and the American continent, laid siege to the
Islamic world from the end of the 1500’s, paralyzing its civilizational and
thus, too, its philosophical development. Classic Arab philosophy was not
able to survive the crisis in the Caliphate of Baghdad and declined defini-
tively thereafter. The presence of the Mongol Empire similarly destroyed
the possibility of new developments in Buddhist and Vedanta philosophies
during the sixteenth century. China, meanwhile, began to feel the weight of
having failed to complete the Industrial Revolution at the end of the eigh-
teenth century, just as Great Britain21 began to experience it fully; by the
end of the same century China had already ceased to produce new hege-
monic philosophy.
In Latin America the process of the Spanish conquest destroyed
all of the most outstanding intellectual and cultural resources of the great
Amerindian cultures; subsequently the Spanish and Portuguese colonies
of the Baroque period were never able to surpass the achievements of the
Scholastics of the sixteenth century Renaissance.
The dominating centrality of Northern Europe as a military, eco-
nomic, political, and cultural power laid the foundation for the develop-
ment of its philosophy from the end of the Middle Ages, from the fifteenth
century of Nicolas de Cusa (1401-1464) and the Italian Renaissance,
with its origins in the presence and influence of the Byzantines expelled by
the Ottomans of Constantinople in 1453.  This made it possible for its
own philosophy to develop and, in the face of the crisis of the other great
regional philosophies, elevate its philosophical particularity to a univer-
sality claim.
Modern European philosophy was therefore positioned in such
a way as to appear to be the universal philosophy-both in its own eyes
and in those of the intellectual communities of the colonial world that lay
prostrate at its feet, and philosophically paralyzed.  It was situated geo-
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graphically, economically, and culturally in the center, able to manipulate
the knowledge and information wrested from all of the peripheral cul-
tures within its grasp. These cultures were connected to the center along a
link running between the Colonial South and the European metropolitan
North, but disconnected from each other, without any South-South rela-
tions or alliances possible as yet. These relation will evolve during the Age
of European Modernity, cultivating an increasing disdain for their own
identities and contributions, which includes forgetting their traditions and
confusing the high levels of development produced by the Industrial Revo-
lution in Europe with the supposedly universal truths in its discourse -
both its content and its methods. This is what makes it possible for Hegel
to write:
“Universal history goes from East to West. Europe is absolutely the end
of universal history.”22 “The Mediterranean Sea is the axis of universal
history.”23
Similarly, certain European mythic narratives will be confused with
the supposedly universal content of purely European philosophical ra-
tionality. Hegel is also the one who wrote that “the Germanic Spirit is the
Spirit of the New World [Modernity], whose end is the realization of the
Absolute Truth.”24  He fails to note, however, that said “Spirit” is regional
(European Christian and not Taoist, Vedanta, Buddhist or Arab), nor is it
global, nor does its content reflect the problems characteristic of other
cultures.  For these reasons, it does not constitute a universal philosophi-
cal discourse, but instead reflects the characteristics of a mythic and pro-
vincial narrative. What does it mean in terms of a strictly universal philo-
sophical rationality to speak of the “Spirit of Christianity”? Why not then
speak of the ‘Spirit of Taoism” or of Buddhism or Confucianism? That
“Spirit” is completely valid as a component of a mythic narrative with
meaning for those who live within the horizons of a regional culture (such
as Europe), but not to attribute to it a rational philosophical content with
an empirically based universal validity, as modern European philosophy
still claims for itself.
Philosophical Eurocentrism is, then, in essence this univer-
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sality claim of a particular philosophy, many aspects of which may still
be absorbed by other traditions. We can assume that all cultures have
ethnocentrist tendencies, but modern European culture was the first whose
ethnocentrism became globalized, with its original regional horizon
extended to coincide with that of the emergent world-system itself, as
proposed by Immanuel Wallerstein.25  But this universality claim falls of its
own weight when philosophers of other philosophical and cultural
traditions become conscious of their own philosophical history and its
grounded implications.
5. Philosophical Universality and Cultural Particularity
None of what I have argued thus far negates that it is possible for
philosophical discourse to take into account the fundamental “core prob-
lems” and attempt to develop responses with universal validity, as contri-
butions that can be discussed by other cultures, since they would involve
problems that are ultimately human and thus universal in character.  K. O.
Apel’s26 effort to define the universal conditions of validity necessary for a
“argumentative discourse” makes it plain that there must be symmetrical
possibilities for each of the participants to engage in the process; other-
wise, the conclusions of the discussion will not be valid because partici-
pants have not participated under equal conditions. This is an ethical-
epistemological formal principle (without any content based in any par-
ticular material value judgment of any culture), that can be assessed criti-
cally by other cultures. Similarly, the fact that there are historical-material
and economic conditions grounded in the affirmation and development of
human life, which are universally necessary for human existence (since we
are subjects in living bodies as suggested by Karl Marx), appears to be
valid for all cultures.  The formal abstract universality of certain statements
or principles, which can be shaped differently at the material level of each
culture, does not negate that they can be “bridges” which can make it
possible for there to be dialogue and debate between different philosophical
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traditions. This meta-philosophy is a product of all humanity, even if it
emerges initially in the context of a specific culture, or in some specific
tradition or historical period, which might have been able to make greater
progress on this issue than others, but from which all the other traditions
could learn from within the bounds of their own historical assumptions.
For example, in the tenth century A.D. in Baghdad, mathematics
advanced significantly, immediately contributing to a leap in the develop-
ment of Arab-Aristotelian philosophy and proving useful to other tradi-
tions as well.  An absolutely post-conventional philosophy is impossible
(implying no relationship to any concrete culture), but all philosophies,
located inevitably in some specific cultural context, are nonetheless ca-
pable of engaging in dialogue with others through the prism of shared
“core problems” and categorical discourses of a philosophical character,
which are universal to the extent that they are human.
6. The New Age of Dialogue between Philosophical Traditions
It has been asserted for too long that this universal function is
fulfilled by modern European philosophy. This insistence has obscured
many great discoveries made by other philosophical traditions. This is
why the great task that lies before us at the beginning of the 21th Century
is the initiation of an inter-philosophical dialogue.
First, we must start with a dialogue between North and South,
because we will be reminded of the continuing presence of colonialism
and its legacies, still with us after five hundred years. This is a multi-dimen-
sional phenomenon that includes economic and political structures and
expressions, as well as cultural and philosophical ones.  The philosophical
communities of the post-colonial world (with their distinct problems and
responses) are still not generally accepted, recognized, nor engaged by
their counterparts in metropolitan hegemonic communities.
Second (and no less important) is the need to undertake and
deepen permanent South-South dialogue, in order to define the agenda of
the most urgent philosophical problems in Africa, Asia, Latin America,
Eastern Europe, etc., and discuss them together philosophically. The rules
for such a dialogue must be patiently developed.
We must lay the pedagogical foundations by educating future gen-
erations in multiple philosophical traditions. For example, in the first se-Enrique Dussel  15
mester in the history of philosophy in our universities at the undergraduate
level, we should begin with the study of the “First Great Philosophers of
Humanity”-the thinkers who developed the original categories of philo-
sophical thinking in Egypt (Africa), Mesopotamia (including the prophets
of Israel), in Greece, India, China, Meso-America, or the Incas.  In the
second semester we should continue with study of the “Great Ontolo-
gies,” including Taoism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, the Greeks
(such as Plato, Aristotle, and up to Plotinus), the Romans, etc.  A third
course should explore later stages of philosophical development in China
(beginning with the founding of the Han empire), later examples of Bud-
dhist and Indian philosophy, Byzantine Christian philosophy, Arab phi-
losophy, the Medieval European philosophy, and so on. This is how a
new generation can begin to think philosophically from within a
global mindset.  The same approach should be reflected in the courses
specializing in ethics, politics, ontology, anthropology, and even logic
(shouldn’t we have some notion of Buddhist logic as well?).
Furthermore, we must ask ourselves if other philosophical tradi-
tions (beyond those of Europe and North America) have wrestled with
questions ignored by our own traditions, even though those traditions might
have explored them in different ways, with varying emphases.  The differ-
ences might provide new perspectives on the particular conditions of the
geopolitical environment where they were engaged. There must not be
only dialogue between East (an ambiguous concept deconstructed by
Edward Saïd) and West (equally ambiguous)27, but also with the world
Periphery, because Africa, Latin America, and other regions are until now
excluded.
We also need a complete reformulation of the history of
philosophy in order to be prepared for such a dialogue. World Philoso-
phy, the pioneering work by the sociologist Randall Collins28, points to
key aspects that must be taken into account.  His comparative analysis
crosses the geography (space) and history (time) of the great Chinese,
Indian, Arab, European, North American, and African philosophers, which
he categorizes in generations and in terms of their relative importance,
although glaring omissions include his failures to devote a single line to five
hundred years of Latin American philosophy, and to the nascent philoso-
phies of the urban cultures prior to the conquest.  Despite these weak-
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nesses, he provides rich information for further interpretation and gives
the philosopher pause, since the author is a sociologist who provides a
great deal of material for philosophical thinking.
7. Inter-philosophical Dialogue towards a Trans-modern Pluriverse
After a long crisis resulting from the impact of modern European
culture and philosophy, the philosophies of other regions are beginning to
recover a sense of their own histories buried beneath the hurricane of
Modernity. Take the example of a contemporary Arab philosopher,
Mahomed Abed Yabri, at the University of Fez in Morocco, a prestigious
university renowned for over a thousand years, and city which in the thir-
teenth century had more than 300,000 inhabitants, and where Moses
Maimonides, among others, went to study and teach.
At a first stage, in A. Yabri’s two works, The Critique of Arab
Reason29 and The Arab Philosophical Legacy: Alfarabi, Avicenna,
Avempace, Averroes, Abenjaldun,30 he begins with an evaluative as-
sessment of the philosophy of his Arab cultural tradition. Along the way,
a) he rejects the tradition of interpretation prevalent in this historical pe-
riod (that of the salafís or fundamentalists), a reaction against Moder-
nity that lacks a creative reconstruction of the philosophical past; b) he
rejects of “Marxist safism,” which forgets its own tradition; and c) he
rejects with equal force the liberal Eurocentric tradition that does not ac-
cept the existence of a contemporary “Arab philosophy.” Instead the au-
thor employs his linguistic skills in Arabic as a native speaker and under-
takes original research in the philosophical traditions of the great thinkers
of the “Eastern” schools (of Egypt, Baghdad, and towards the East, under
the influence of Avicenna) and of the “Western” schools (of the Caliphate
of Cordoba, including the Berber regions of Fez) that pivot around the
contributions of ’Ibn Rushd.
At a second stage in his exploration, A.Yabri undertakes a cri-
tique of his own philosophical tradition by employing the resources of
Arab philosophy itself, but also drawing from some of the achievements
of modern hermeneutics (which he studied in Paris). This combination
makes it possible for him to discover new historical elements in his own
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tradition, for instance, that the Arab “Eastern” tradition had to contend
with Persian Gnostic thinking as a principal rival. Thus the mu’ltazilíes
created the first Arab philosophy: by opposing Persia and at the same
time drawing upon Greco-Byzantine philosophy in order to justify the
legitimacy of the Caliphate. Subsequently Al-Farabi and ’Ibn Sina
(Avicenna), employing neo-Platonic categories, will produce a philosophi-
cal-mystical tradition of illumination. While Andalusian-Maghrebi “West-
ern” philosophy, inspired by the scientific empiricism and strictly Aristote-
lian thought (with the characteristic slogan: “abandon the argument based
on authority and go back to the sources” as urged by the Almohade ’Ibn
Túmert) will produce the great Arab philosopher ’Ibn Rushd, a true philo-
sophical Enlightenment (Aufklärung), which will be the origin of  the Latin-
Germanic philosophy in 13th Century, which was at the same time the
foundational moment of the modern European philosophy.  ’Ibn Rushd
perfectly defines what inter-philosophical dialogue should consist of:
“Undoubtedly we should build upon and take from the contributions
resulting from the research of all who have preceded us (the Greeks, the
Christians), as sources of assistance in our process of rational study [...]
Given that this is so, and since the ancient philosophers already studied
with great diligence the rules of reasoning (logic, method), it will be appro-
priate for us to dedicate our labors to the study of the works of these
ancient philosophers, and if everything we find in them is reasonable, we
can accept it, and if not, those things that are not reasonable can serve as
a warning and a basis for precaution.”31
At a third stage, that of new creation based upon one’s own
tradition and nourished by dialogue with other cultures, we should not
allow ourselves to be blinded by the apparent splendor of a modern Eu-
ropean philosophy that has laid the groundwork for exploring its own
problems, but not for exploring the problems particular to the Arab world:
“How can Arab philosophy assimilate the experience of liberalism before
the Arab world has experienced that stage, or without having done so?”32
One more theme must be addressed at fourth final stage. The
dialogue that can enrich each philosophical tradition must be carried out
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by critical and creative philosophers in each tradition, and not by those
who simply repeat the philosophical theses that are the traditional echoes
of consensus.  An essential element of such a critical stance is for philoso-
phers to assume the responsibility for addressing the ethical and political
problems associated with the poverty, domination, and exclusion of large
sectors of the population, especially in the Global South (in Africa, Asia,
or Latin America).  A critical philosophical dialogue presupposes critical
philosophers, in the sense of the “critical theory”, which we in Latin America
refer to our reality as Philosophy of Liberation
European Modernity has impacted cultures throughout the world
through colonialism (except for China, Japan, and a few others, who were
spared direct European rule). It exploited their resources, extracted infor-
mation from their cultures, and discarded  that which it could not absorb.
When I speak of Trans-modernity, I am referring to a global project that
seeks to transcend European or North American Modernity. It is a project
that is not post-modern, since post-Modernity is a still-incomplete cri-
tique of Modernity by European and North America.  Instead, Trans-
modernity is a task that is, in my case, expressed philosophically, whose
point of departure is that which has been discarded, devalued, and judged
use-less among global cultures, including colonized or peripheral philoso-
phies.  This project involves the development of the potential of those
cultures and philosophies that have been ignored, upon the basis of their
own resources, in constructive dialogue with European and North Ameri-
can Modernity.  It is in this way that Arab philosophy, for example, could
incorporate the hermeneutics of European philosophy, develop and apply
them in order to discover new interpretations of the Korán that would
make possible a new, much-needed Arab political philosophy, or Arab
feminism. It will be the fruit of the Arab philosophical tradition, updated
through inter-philosophical dialogue (not only with Europe, but equally
with Latin America, India, China, etc.), oriented towards a pluriversal
future global philosophy.  This project is necessarily trans-modern, and
thus also trans-capitalist.
For a long time, perhaps for centuries, the many diverse philosophical
traditions will each continue to follow their own paths, but nonetheless a
global analogical project of a trans-modern pluriverse (other than uni-
versal, and not post-modern) appears on the horizon.  Now, “other phi-
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losophies” are possible, because “another world is possible” -as is pro-
claimed by the Zapatista Liberation Movement in Chiapas, Mexico.
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